

THE AMERICAN ROLE

gence services, and he was said to be critical of the work of the Office of Strategic Services. It seems, however, that this correct attitude toward the Russians was not entirely reciprocated by them, and cases of actual Soviet espionage in the P.G.C. were revealed after the end of the war.⁷ The General's personal ambition to reach record figures in deliveries to Russia was appreciated by the Soviet side. He was one of the very few Allied officers to be invited by the Soviet High Command to visit the Russian front. This was, no doubt, one of the highest compliments the Russians could pay to an American.

Most of the American troops did not have much actual contact with the Russians. Most contacts were established, for technical reasons, at Teheran and Qazvin, where the Russians were taking over American goods. There was little personal fraternization since the Russian soldiers were forbidden to mingle with foreigners. Anyway they could not be expected to be able to afford the company of well-paid American G.I's. The Americans, on their part, treated the Russians in their usual light-hearted and friendly way, offering them cigarettes, beer, and similar luxuries of Western capitalism, but no evidence of any deeper understanding or friendship between them existed. By the same token there was no evidence that these American citizens, temporarily wearing uniforms, were properly informed by their leaders of the real problems of Iran. This, however, was not exactly the task for the Persian Gulf Command. It was rather the question of basic policies on higher army and government levels and involved the general issue of the substance of the army indoctrination courses. Stripped bare, the problem resolved itself into the

question whether American citizens in wartime, in uniform or out, should be told the entire truth about the world situation or only part of it.

The next aspect of the army's operations in Iran was the impact upon Irano-American relations. Generally speaking, this impact was of a positive nature. The Iranians learned more about America by looking at the American troops, on and off duty, than they could learn in any other way. And what they learned was certainly encouraging. In work the Americans were efficient and dynamic. In

' See an article by Major J. R. Walsh, "Middle East Has Long History of Espionage among Nations," in the *Washington Post*, March 22, 1946.